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Abstract
The free−riding issue is generally considered to be the biggest obstacle in the success of an
international environmental agreement. Even without free−riding incentives, however,
asymmetric information can pose a potentially significant threat in establishing a cooperative
relationship. In this note, we examine perfect Bayesian equilibria of a simple signaling game
between a polluter country and a victim country over an agreement to mitigate unidirectional
transboudary pollution. We show that the stalemate in addressing an international
environmental issue can be explained partly by the incentive conflict due to asymmetric
information on the environmental preference of a polluter. We also identify several
conditions that allow such a stalemate to occur more easily.
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1.  Introduction 
 
As a general principle to solve international environmental conflicts where polluters 
and victims are easily identified, many nations have agreed to the so-called Polluter Pays 
Principle where a polluter should take full or, at least, partial responsibility for the 
environmental damages that it inflicts upon other nations.  Without a proper institution to 
enforce this principle, however, any international agreement has to be established on a 
voluntary basis.  Hence, economists have advocated the application of the Victim Pays 
Principle as a more pragmatic approach to alleviate transboundary pollution under the 
current international circumstances (e.g., Baumol and Oates 1988). 
In reality, however, it is quite rare to observe a large-scale side payment from a victim 
in order to combat transboundry pollution.  There have been several previous studies to 
explain why we rarely observe such international transfer provision even in simple 
unidirectional pollution from one polluter to one victim.
1  The aim of this note is to 
present another possible explanation for the scarcity of cooperative relationships based on 
side payments in unidirectional pollution problems.  Its main thesis is that asymmetric 
information about the environmental damage cost that a polluter incurs from its own 
emissions can be a source of difficulty in establishing such a relationship.  Even though 
physical environmental damages of a polluter can be somehow observable to a victim, the 
polluter’s evaluation of its damages would be very difficult to infer from outside. 
To an economic problem with a hidden characteristic, the idea of the “revelation 
principle” has been widely applied (Fudenberg and Tiorle 1991).  For unidirectional 
pollution with asymmetric information on a polluter’s damage cost, this principle 
essentially implies that a victim can come up with a certain menu of various contracts, 
each of which is intended for a particular type of the polluter, and that allowing the 
polluter to voluntarily choose his favorite contract will, in fact, result in the revelation of 
its true type and the highest possible welfare for the victim, even though some 
information rent will usually accrue to the polluter, depending on its actual type.  In each 
contract, the amount of side payment from the victim and the polluter’s abatement level in 
the agreement is clearly specified.  Then, a contract is immediately agreed by the two 
parties to implement, which does not explain the observed infrequency of international 
agreements with side payments.  In our model, the offer of this sort of two-dimensional 
                                                 
1 Mäler (1990) contends that too great willingness to provide a side payment may give this country a reputation as a 
“weak” negotiator and increase the costs of other agreements.  Another possible explanation would be the existence of 
transaction cost that works against any kind of international agreement.  Also, it has been pointed out that considering a 
transboundary environmental issue and other international relations at the same time could lead to a situation where a 
cooperative relationship can be more easily attained, even in the absence of a side payment (Cesar and de Zeeuw 1995). 
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contract is not allowed, which seems to be the case of the ongoing negotiations on global 
warming.  The target emission level of each country has been predetermined in the Kyoto 
protocol while the amount of side payment is still under debate. 
After describing our game model in the next section, we discuss its equilibria and 
their properties in the subsequent section. 
 
2.  Model 
 
In order to focus on the issue with asymmetric information rather than the “free-ride” 
problem which could arise among multiple polluters or victims, we assume that there are 
only one polluter and one victim in this unidirectional pollution problem.  Let e be the 
level of pollutant abatement effort made by the polluter.
2  Without the loss of generality, 
we restrict our attentions to a very tractable case of a quadratic abatement function for a 
polluter and linear damage cost functions for the two countries.
3  We suppose that the 
possible types of the polluter’s damage cost are limited to two types, and, moreover, that 
the difference between these two types is entirely represented by the difference in the 
slopes of these damage cost functions.  Specifically, the damage cost function of the 
polluter with type i, DCp
i(e), is defined as 
). ( ) ( e e e DC
u
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i
p − =θ              ( 1 )  
Here, θi is either θL or θH (θH > θL), depending upon its types, and ep
u is the abatement 
level above which the pollutant emissions become completely harmless for both types of 
the polluter.  The actual value of the parameter, θi, is privately known to the polluter, and 
the victim has an ex ante probability distribution regarding the type of the damage cost 
function of the polluter.  This “prior belief” is defined such that the victim originally 
expects to face the low damage type and the high damage type with the probability of p (0 
< p < 1) and 1-p, respectively.  We assume that this belief is common knowledge. 
On the other hand, the damage cost function of the victim, DCv(e), is expressed as 
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Similarly to ep
u above, ev
u is the polluter’s abatement level above which the pollutant 
emissions are harmless for the victim.  The parameter d is a constant and known by both 
countries.  Furthermore, we suppose d ≥ 2(θH-θL), i.e., the damage cost of the victim is at 
                                                 
2 We assume that pollutant emissions in the victim country are completely contained for simplicity. 
3 Our main results hold true as long as the polluter’s abatement cost function is increasing and strictly convex in e and 
the damage cost functions of the victim and the polluter are both decreasing and convex in e. 
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least twice as large as the difference in the damage costs of the two polluter’s types.  As 
we will see below, otherwise there is a possibility that a negative amount of side payment 
is offered by the victim and accepted by the high cost type polluter in the equilibrium. 
Finally, the abatement cost function of the polluter, AC(e), is expressed as 
2
2
1
) ( ce e AC = ,               ( 3 )  
where c is a known constant.  We suppose that c is sufficiently large so that the level of 
abatement efforts will not reach ep
u or ev
u under any circumstance.  Then, due to the linear 
specification of the damage cost function, these values actually become insignificant in 
our analysis.  For these simply specified set of functions, we can easily derive the 
corresponding “marginal” functions.  Let us denote the marginal abatement cost function 
by MAC(e), and the negatives of the marginal damage cost functions of the victim and the 
polluter by MDCv(e) and MDCp
i(e) (the superscript i signifies the polluter’s type and i = L 
or H), respectively.
4  Figure 1 depicts these marginal cost curves. 
If there is complete information on the type of the polluter, we can easily identify its 
truthful abatement level in the non-cooperative situation, where the polluter takes only its 
own cost into account, as the level that minimizes the sum of its abatement and damage 
costs, i.e., DCp
i(e) + AC(e).  Such an abatement level can be implicitly given by the usual 
marginal condition, which is MAC(e) = MDCp
i(e).
5  On the contrary, the internationally 
optimal abatement level or the abatement level in the cooperative case, where the damage 
cost of the victim is added to the consideration, is given by MAC(e) = MDCp
i(e) + 
MDCv(e).  This is simply a variation of the “Samuelson condition” for the provision of a 
public good. 
The four abatement levels, eN
L, eN
H, eC
L and e C
H, in Figure 1 are respectively the 
non-cooperative abatement levels and the cooperative abatement levels for the two 
different types of the polluter, and they are obtained through the corresponding marginal 
conditions.  Given our functional forms, the non-cooperative abatement level of the 
polluter in the absence of a side payment can be derived as ei
N = θi/c for i = L or H.  On the 
other hand, the cooperative abatement level can be derived as ei
C = (θi+d)/c for i = L or H. 
Now, we model our problem as a simple signaling game.
6  The game tree in Figure 2 
depicts strategic interactions between the polluter and the victim.  As is well known in the 
game theory literature, a game of incomplete information can be transformed with the 
introduction of an initial move by “Nature” to a game of imperfect information (Harsanyi 
                                                 
4 In other words, MDCv(e) and MDCp
i(e) signify the values of environmental damages avoided by one additional unit of 
abatement effort. 
5 These marginal conditions are not only necessary but also sufficient for cost-minimization. 
6 For game-theoretic concepts used in this note, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). 
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1967).  An important restriction of this transformation in our context is that the victim’s 
prior belief on the polluter’s damage cost must be common knowledge.  With this 
transformation, Nature moves initially to determine the type of the polluter’s domestic 
damage cost.  Knowing this Nature’s move, the polluter at the node PL
0 or PH
0 makes an 
announcement regarding its non-cooperative level of abatement.  Here, we assume that 
this announcement is committed in the sense that the polluter has to implement the chosen 
non-cooperative abatement level without any assistance in case that the agreement is not 
eventually reached.
7  We will discuss the alteration of this assumption later. 
After this action of the polluter, the abatement level in the international agreement is 
determined so as to maximize the global gain from the agreement according to the 
announced non-cooperative abatement level by the polluter.  That is, the cooperative or 
internationally optimal level of abatement identified above is selected as the abatement 
level in a potential agreement.  We assume that this decision is made exogenously by an 
outside agency or through a separate negotiation between the two countries.  Then, the 
victim chooses the amount of side payment, s, which will be offered to the polluter in 
exchange for attaining the cooperative abatement level.  Finally, the polluter chooses 
either to accept this offer of a side payment or to reject it.  In case of its acceptance, the 
two countries engage in the international agreement which implies the implementation of 
the corresponding cooperative abatement level by the polluter and the provision of the 
side payment by the victim.  In case of its rejection, the polluter implements its 
announced non-cooperative abatement level without any assistance from the victim. 
The respective payoffs for the two countries in Figure 2 are obtained by calculating 
the corresponding areas in Figure 1.  Let us denote the total costs for conducting the 
truthful non-cooperative abatement levels by α for the low cost type and by β for the high 
cost type, i.e., DCp
L(eL
N) + AC(eL
N) = α and DCp
H(eH
N) + AC(eH
N) = β.
 8
  On the other hand, 
we evaluate the victim’s payoffs by supposing that its welfare level at eL
N is standardized 
to zero.  These assumptions are innocuous as long as the payoffs in all the other situations 
are based on these benchmarks for both type of the polluter and for the victim.  Let us also 
denote θH - θL by θ for the sake of notational convenience.  The left and right entries in 
each parenthesis in Figure 2 are the payoffs of the polluter and the victim, respectively. 
In our setup, the choice of eH by the polluter essentially reveals that it is the high cost 
type since the low cost type would never choose eH at the node PL
0.  This is because the 
low cost type polluter can secure itself the payoff of α by choosing eL while it would only 
                                                 
7  Equivalently, the announcement can be made concerning its own damage cost as long as its non-cooperative 
abatement level of the polluter is based on this announcement when an agreement eventually fails. 
8 Since both α and β signify costs, these values are negative in terms of the polluter’s payoffs. 
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obtain α-θ(θ+2d)/2c,
9 when it is required to abate up to eH
C and the victim provides the 
side payment that would leave the high cost type polluter just break-even at β, which is 
represented by the area (b+f+g) in Figure 1.  Hence, the interaction after the choice of eH, 
i.e., after the information set VH is reached, is straightforward.  By contrast, the high cost 
type has an incentive to lie and choose eL at the node PH
0 because of the possibility that it 
is treated as the low cost type and required to abate only up to eL
C with the side payment 
that would leave the low cost type polluter just break-even at α.  Such a side payment 
yields the high cost type polluter a strictly greater payoff than β by the area (a+c), which 
is obtained by subtracting the area (b) from the area (a+b+c) in Figure 1.
10 
 
3.  Equilibria and Their Properties 
 
In fact, mere consideration of the victim’s belief at the information set VL in Figure 2 
suggests that we do not have a “separating” equilibrium where both types of the polluter 
act honestly at their initial nodes.  Let us suppose that, when the information set VL is 
reached, the victim believes that the polluter is the low cost type with the probability r (0 
≤ r ≤ 1) and it is the high cost type with the probability 1-r.  If both types of the polluter 
behaves honestly, the consistency of the victim’s posterior belief specifies r = 1.  Then, 
the victim will offer the side payment that leaves the low cost type just break-even.  
However, such an amount of side payment will induce the high cost type to switch its 
strategy and choose eL
N, thus annihilating the possibility of this separating equilibrium. 
As demonstrated in the appendix, we can derive two different kinds of perfect 
Bayesian equilibria, depending on the prior belief of the victim concerning the polluter’s 
type.  The first is a “hybrid” or “semi-separating” equilibrium which occurs when p < 
2θ/(d+2θ).  In this equilibrium, the high cost type polluter employs the mixed local 
strategy as its initial move, randomizing between eL
N and eH
N with the probabilities u = 
dp/2θ(1-p) and 1-u, respectively.  At the information set VL, the victim’s posterior belief is 
r
* = 2θ/(d+2θ) on the left node and 1- r
* on the right node, and it offers s = d
2/2c with the 
probability w = θ/2d, and s = (d
2-2θd)/2c with the probability 1-w.  The polluter accepts 
this offer only when its payoff from the acceptance is greater than its payoff from 
rejecting the offer, that is, s ≥ d
2/2c for the low cost type and s ≥ (d
2-2θd)/2c for the high 
cost type, and otherwise it rejects the offer, implying that an international agreement fails 
in the latter case.  The other possible equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium where both the 
                                                 
9 This is explained more formally in the appendix.  This low cost type polluter’s payoff is obtained as α minus the area 
(a+c+h), which in turn is the area (b+f+g) minus the area (a+b+c+f+g+h) in Figure 1. 
10 A similar incentive problem is discussed by Huber and Wirl (1996) and Kerschbamer and Maderner (2001).  As in 
Huber and Wirl (1996), the past abatement levels do not necessarily reveal the true damage cost of the polluter here. 
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low and high cost types of the polluter choose eL
N as their non-cooperative abatement 
level.  This equilibrium realizes if p ≥ 2θ/(d+2θ) = r
*.  In this pooling equilibrium, the 
victim does not update its posterior belief.  The polluter’s initial move is followed by the 
offer of s = d
2/2c by the victim and this offer will be accepted.  An international 
agreement on a rather small scale always materializes in this equilibrium. 
The most interesting result obtained here is that there is a possibility that an 
international agreement is not reached successfully despite the fact that it represents a 
Pareto improving change.
11   In the hybrid equilibrium, an agreement fails with the 
probability r
*(1-w) = {θ(2d-θ)}/{d(d+2θ)}, because the low cost type polluter rejects the 
offer of s = (d
2-2θd)/2c from the victim.  Let us define q = r
*(1-w).  Interestingly, the value 
of q does not depend on the victim’s prior belief concerning the polluter’s type.  This is 
because, no matter what the victim’s prior belief might be, the value of r has to equal r
* = 
2θ/(d+2θ) for a mixed strategy to become the equilibrium strategy for the victim, which 
in turn is required for the realization of the hybrid equilibrium.  On the other hand, the 
victim’s prior belief is critical in determining whether the hybrid equilibrium actually 
emerges.  As long as p is sufficiently small, which means that the polluter is believed 
sufficiently likely to be the high cost type, we have a non-zero probability that a mutually 
beneficial international agreement is rejected by the polluter. 
Furthermore, we can easily derive ∂r
*/∂d = -2θ /(d+2θ)
2 < 0, which implies that, the 
more concerned the victim is about its own environmental damages, the less likely we 
have the hybrid equilibrium given a certain ex ante probability distribution over the types 
of the polluter.  We can also obtain ∂q/∂d = 2θ{d(θ-d)+θ
2}/{d(d+2θ)}
2, where q is the 
probability that an international agreement fails in the hybrid equilibrium.  Then, a simple 
calculation shows that ∂q/∂d < 0 always holds for d ≥ 2θ.  This result implies that the 
likelihood of an eventual disagreement goes down with the increase in d.  Both ∂r
*/∂d < 0, 
and ∂q/∂d < 0 indicate that an international agreement is more likely to be reached if the 
victim cares about its own environmental damages more significantly.  These results are 
somewhat intuitive in that, the more important this environmental issue is to the victim, 
the more strongly it would seek an international agreement even if it might allow the high 
cost type polluter to disguise as the low cost type. 
On the other hand, we can derive ∂r
*/∂θ = 2d/(d+2θ)
2 > 0.  This implies that, the 
greater the difference between the two polluter’s types is, the more likely the hybrid 
equilibrium realizes, although whether we have the hybrid equilibrium or the pooling 
                                                 
11 Our setting is an example of a “gap case” since the total welfare gain from an agreement is always strictly greater than 
the cost of implementing it, irrespective of the polluter’s type (Muthoo 1999).  Hence, if there are infinite opportunities 
of making proposals instead of just once as in our model, the two parties can always reach a mutually beneficial 
agreement in some finite time.  However, the delay in reaching an agreement still represents an overall efficiency loss. 
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equilibrium also depends on the actual value of p.  Moreover, we can derive ∂q/∂θ = 
2d{d
2-θ(d+θ)}/{d(d+2θ)}
2.  Then, it follows that ∂q/∂θ > 0 for d ≥ 2θ.  Hence, the 
likelihood of the actual failure of the international agreement in the hybrid equilibrium 
goes up with the increase in θ.  Both ∂r
*/∂θ > 0 and ∂q/∂θ > 0 indicate that the two 
countries have more difficulty in reaching an agreement when the difference between the 
two types of the polluter is relatively large.  In such a case, the high cost type polluter 
finds it more difficult to successfully disguise itself as the low cost type. 
Finally, we assumed above that the polluter needs to commit to its initially announced 
non-cooperative abatement level in the sense that it has to implement this level of 
abatement when an agreement eventually fails.  If the costs of revoking its previous 
announcement, such losing a reputation as a negotiator, are relatively insignificant, the 
polluter could renege on its previous announcement.  There may be no other significant 
relations in which the polluter is engaged currently or in the foreseeable future.  If such an 
act is completely costless, we only observe the pooling equilibrium where the polluter 
always chooses eL
N at the node PH
0.  The high cost type polluter will never do worse by 
claiming eL
N than by acting honestly because it is guaranteed the payoff of β even by 
initially choosing eL
N in this case.  Therefore, the belief of the victim at the information 
set VL simply coincides with its prior belief.  A simple calculation shows that, if p ≥ 
(2θd-θ
2)/(d
2+2θd-θ
2), the victim offers s = d
2/2c, and if p < (2θd-θ
2)/(d
2+2θd-θ
2), it offers 
s = (d-θ)
2/2c.  Although this outcome is qualitatively different from the one above, there 
is still a possibility that an international agreement fails when p < (2θd-θ
2)/(d
2+2θd-θ
2) 
because the low cost type polluter surely rejects the offer of s = (d-θ)
2/2c. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
The stalemate in addressing an international environmental issue can be explained 
partly by the incentive conflict arisen from asymmetric information on the environmental 
preference of a polluter.  Without the information on its damage cost, a victim or any 
international agency cannot judge exactly what would be the internationally optimal level 
of abatement and the appropriate amount of side payment.  In this study, we examined a 
signaling game between a polluter country and a victim country over an agreement to 
mitigate unidirectional transboudary pollution.  In our simple analytical setting, we 
demonstrated that the existence of asymmetric information can prohibit the realization of 
a Pareto-superior international agreement under certain circumstances.  Failure of an 
agreement occurs when the uncertainty over the polluter’s damage cost is sufficiently 
significant compared to the size of the victim’s damage cost. 
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Figure 2. Game Tree
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Appendix: Derivation of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria 
 
As mentioned above, the low cost type polluter would never choose eH
N at the node 
PL
0 in Figure 2.  It can secure the payoff of α by choosing eL
N.  In order for the low cost 
type polluter to have a greater payoff than α following its choice of eH at the node PL
0, the 
amount of the side payment needs to be more than (θ+d)
 2/2c because it will be required to 
abate up to eH
C as the cooperative abatement level.  However, such a significant amount 
of side payment would result in a strictly negative payoff for the victim, thus annihilating 
the incentive for the low cost type polluter to imitate the high cost type.  When the 
polluter chooses eH, the victim is certain that it is the high cost type and offers s = d
2/2c, 
which will be accepted by the high cost type polluter at node PL
2. 
Basically, we can solve this game backward.  The action of the polluter after either PL
1 
or PH
1 in Figure 2 is straightforward.  Each type of the polluter accepts a side payment 
from the victim and engages in an agreement only if its payoff from the acceptance is 
greater than its payoff from the rejection.  In particular, this implies that the low cost type 
polluter ought to accept s if s+α-d
2/2c ≥ α, that is, s ≥ d
2/2c, and reject s otherwise at PL
1.  
The high cost type polluter would rather accept s if s+β-(d-θ)
2/2c ≥ β-θ
2/2c, which can be 
transformed to s ≥ (d
2-2θd)/2c, and reject s otherwise at PH
1. 
Given these strategies of the two types of the polluter at these terminal nodes 
following eL in the initial move and its belief over the types of the polluter, the victim 
determines the amount of side payment.  The belief is characterized by the value of r, and 
the objective of the victim is to maximize its expected payoff.  Let Pr(s) be the probability 
that the offer of s is accepted by the polluter.  Then, the victim’s problem is expressed as 
) Pr(
2
s s
c
d
Max
s  


 


− .                      (A1) 
According to the polluter’s response toward s at its last nodes, there are three 
possible values for Pr(s); Pr(s) = 1 when s ≥ d
2/2c, Pr(s) = 1-r when d
2/2c > s ≥ 
(d
2-2θd)/2c, and Pr(s) = 0 when s < (d
2-2θd)/2c. 
In order for the victim to employ a mixed strategy, the expected payoff from offering 
s = d
2/2c must be equal to the expected payoff from offering s = (d
2-2θd)/2c.  Thus, a 
mixed strategy is employed by the victim only when 
c
d
c
d
c
d d
c
d
r
2 2
2
) 1 (
2 2 2 2
− =  


 

 −
− −
θ
.                  (A2) 
By solving (A2) for r, we obtain r = 2θ/(d+2θ).  This particular value of r turns out to be 
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an important threshold and we have denoted it by r
* above.  If the victim believes that 
there is more chance of the polluter’s being the low cost type than r
*, it offers s = d
2/2c.  
On the contrary, when it believes that the polluter is less likely to be the low cost type than 
r
*, the victim offers s = (d
2-2θd)/2c.  Then, only when r = r
* = 2θ/(d+2θ), the victim 
employs a mixed strategy.  Let us suppose that, as its mixed strategy, the victim chooses s 
= d
2/2c with the probability w (0 < w < 1) and s = (d
2-2θd)/2c with the probability 1-w, 
respectively. 
Now, we consider the action taken by the high cost type polluter at the node PH
0.  
When it chooses eH
N, the international agreement aimed at eH
C will be implemented with 
the side payment which makes the high cost type polluter just as well off as at its truthful 
non-cooperative situation because the victim is certain that no low cost type polluter had 
chosen eH
N at the node PH
0, as we have seen above.  Consequently, the high cost type 
polluter nets β by choosing eH
N.  Then, the expected payoff from choosing eL
N must also 
be β for the high cost type polluter to randomize at PH
0.  In such a hybrid equilibrium, 
therefore, the following equation has to be satisfied: 
β
θ
β
θ θ
β =  


 

 −
− +
−
− +  


 

 −
− +
c
d
c
d d
w
c
d
c
d
w
2
) (
2
2
) 1 (
2
) (
2
2 2 2 2
.            (A3) 
Solving (A3) for w, we obtain w = θ/2d (note that, because we assumed d ≥ 2θ, it is 
always the case that 0 < w = θ/2d < 1).  Hence, for a mixed strategy to be the equilibrium 
strategy for the high cost type polluter, we need w = θ/2d in the victim’s mixed strategy. 
Finally, we must specify the belief of the victim when the information set VL is 
reached.  This posterior belief has to be determined by the Bayes’ rule, given the victim’s 
prior belief and the equilibrium strategy of the polluter.  The probability with which the 
high cost type polluter chooses eL
N at the node PH
0 is u (0 < u < 1) as in Figure 2.  As we 
have seen above, in order for the victim to employ its mixed strategy, we must have r = 
2θ/(d+2θ).  Hence, by the Bayes’ rule, the following equation must be satisfied: 
u p p
p
d ) 1 ( 2
2
− +
=
+ θ
θ
.                      (A4) 
Solving (A4) for u, we obtain u = dp/2θ(1-p).  While the constraint 0 < u can be trivially 
satisfied, the constraint u < 1 provides a condition for obtaining the hybrid equilibrium.  
That is, we have the hybrid equilibrium only if u = dp/2θ(1-p) < 1, which yields the 
condition upon p as p < 2θ/(d+2θ).  On the other hand, if p ≥ 2θ/(d+2θ), we have the 
pooling equilibrium where both the low cost and high cost types of the polluter choose eL
N 
at PL
0 and PH
0, respectively. 
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